Kalam Jadeed 0906-2

At the outset, I want to offer an introduction concerning the fact that, from the very beginning of history, all human beings have reflected on three fundamental questions.

• warning: The ASR is highly uncertain; the repair preserves only the clearly recoverable meaning.

From the very beginning of history, human beings have reflected on three fundamental questions—questions that have been present in the minds of all people from the outset: Who knows what these three questions are? Where have I come from? Where am I going? And, being here, what should I do?

Rumi presents these three fundamental questions in a very famous poem, one that has been widely discussed around the world: “Where have I come from? For what purpose did I come? Where, ultimately, am I going?”

• term: مولوی is rendered as Rumi.

These three questions therefore exist in the minds of all human beings: Why are we here? Where have we come from? And what will be the outcome and destiny of our lives? We call these questions اعتقادی, or questions of faith and belief. Every school and intellectual tradition, including philosophy, must respond to them.

• term: اعتقادی is retained in transliteration and explained as concerning faith and belief.

In the East as well, philosophical schools—from Eastern philosophy to the philosophies of Avicenna, Aristotle, and Plato—have all tried to answer these three questions: Where have I come from? Where am I going? What are this beginning, this end, and this path? What is my path, and how should I travel it?

• term: ابن‌سینا is rendered as Avicenna.

These are the fundamental, faith-related questions of human beings, and all of us must attend to them. Kalam seeks to answer these three questions: What is my origin? It is God—this is tawḥīd. Maʿād concerns our final destiny, while nubuwwah shows us who gives us guidance and how the path of life is to be followed.

• term: توحید, معاد, and نبوت are transliterated as tawḥīd, maʿād, and nubuwwah.

Maʿād concerns our final destiny, and nubuwwah comes to show us the way—how we should live in this world. Thus, the aim of kalam is to answer these three questions, and religion has the same aim. Religion and kalam both seek to respond to these three questions.

This is why the prophets came, and why the Qur’an and the heavenly books were revealed: to answer these three questions. What is the task of kalam? It is to defend religion’s answers. Thus, the task of kalam is to defend religious beliefs and the answers that religion gives to these questions.

Why is this discipline called kalam? Just as, when you study philosophy, you should ask why that discipline is called philosophy, when you study kalam you should also ask why it is called kalam. The early authorities—specialists in the science of kalam—have listed several reasons; I will mention one of the most important.

The first reason is that the subject of kalam is God and the challenging questions concerning Him. One of the most important and controversial discussions in kalam has been the question of God’s speech. At the beginning of the Islamic centuries, theologians debated intensely whether God’s speech was eternal or created.

• term: کلام خدا is translated as God’s speech, a technical theological issue.

Is God’s speech created? Does God create His speech? Since this was one of the discipline’s most important subjects, the discipline came to be called kalam. Another explanation concerns the ability to speak: if someone learns this science, his power of speech increases.

Someone who learns kalam can speak well. Theologians, public speakers, and preachers are people who can address others effectively; in this sense, the discipline was called kalam because it strengthens human speech. Another reason is that theologians began their discussions with the word kalam—for example, “al-kalām fī al-tawḥīd,” “discourse on tawḥīd.”

• term: الکلام فی التوحید is transliterated and translated.

The second chapter likewise began with “al-kalām fī al-nubuwwah.” Because they began the titles of their discussions with the word kalam, the discipline came to be called kalam. There are several other explanations, but they are not important for the moment. In any case, today we are dealing with a discipline called New Kalam, and we want to see what makes it new.

Today’s discussion concerns why this discipline is called New Kalam. We will also see that it is described in different ways: New Theology, philosophy of religion, philosophical kalam, and New Kalam. These four terms refer approximately to the same field. But why is it called New Kalam?

Muslim theologians in the past did not use this expression at all. The first person to use it was the Indian theologian and Muslim thinker Shibli Nomani. After him, the Indian thinker Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan also used the expression.

• term: شبلی نعمانی and سید احمدخان are rendered as Shibli Nomani and Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan.

What does “Sir” mean? “Sir” was an English title given by the British to certain people—those who served the British government or were regarded by it as useful servants. Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan also received this title for that reason.

• context: The passage reflects the speaker’s critical explanation of the colonial title “Sir.”

In Iran, the first person to use this expression was the martyr Morteza Motahhari. He argued that we must respond to the new doubts that had emerged in the world; therefore, he called it New Kalam.

• term: شهید مرتضی مطهری is rendered as Martyr Morteza Motahhari.

If another form of kalam is created in the future, what will it be called? If this is New Kalam, the next form will be newer still. In the Islamic sphere, we use our own Islamic sources; however, these questions first arose in the West.

• warning: The middle of the ASR is unclear; the translation follows the recoverable contrast between Islamic sources and questions originating in the West.

These issues were not originally our own. They arose in the West because of intellectual crises, and once we entered the modern world, we too were compelled to confront these doubts and questions and respond to them.

Our question now is this: in what does this newness, this modernity, consist? What has become new? The first answer is that “new” qualifies the issues: new theological questions and problems have emerged. Different issues were also central in different periods of Islamic history; at one time the question concerned Mahdism, while at another it concerned prophethood.

• term: مهدویت is translated as Mahdism; نبوت as prophethood.

What is the problem today? Pluralism, for example, or the relation between science and religion. On this view, we should speak of new theological doubts or issues rather than New Kalam. Ayatollah Subhani has also written a book entitled New Theological Issues. According to this view, “new” qualifies the issues: as knowledge expands, we encounter new questions and new answers.

• term: آیت‌الله سبحانی is rendered as Ayatollah Subhani.

This is the first view: newness qualifies the issues, meaning the new problems we encounter. The second view is that newness concerns new subject matters. In the past, most of our questions concerned what exists and what does not exist.

What exists and what does not exist? In kalam, we sought to establish that God exists, that resurrection exists, and that there is a world called the hereafter. Thus, in the past, our propositions and questions mainly concerned existents and nonexistents: what is there and what is not there?

• warning: The final English phrase in the ASR is retained only as a transition and is not treated as an additional claim.

Today, however, the subject matter of our questions has broadened, and we also ask about oughts and ought-not’s: what should be and what should not be? These are evaluative, moral, and legal propositions—propositions concerning what ought and ought not to be. This subject was formerly addressed in jurisprudential rulings, but it has now become part of contemporary kalam.

• term: احکام is rendered as jurisprudential rulings.

This subject is not entirely new; it had already appeared in kalam in another form. Consider, for example, the problem of evil. This issue concerns good and evil.

The problem of evil is not merely an ontological problem; it also concerns oughts and ought-not’s: Is our action good or evil? Should we do this or should we not? The question of rational حسن and قبح—whether good and evil, and ought and ought-not, are rational or religiously determined—was also discussed in classical kalam. This is one view, although I do not accept it myself. Another view is that newness qualifies the method.

• term: حسن و قبح is retained as ḥusn and qubḥ in the sense of moral goodness and badness.

Here, newness qualifies the method: we have developed new methods for answering these questions. Previously, our method was only rational and demonstrative—that is, argument and reason. Now the method of responding has changed, and we also use empirical methods and the empirical sciences.

For example, in empirical matters we use the empirical sciences. The Qur’an discusses the nature of the earth: whether it is round or has another form. These matters have been established, and we use experience to understand and defend religious beliefs. This too is one view.

• warning: The ASR is uncertain in the opening and middle; the translation preserves the clear example concerning empirical knowledge and religious belief.

Some say that newness concerns the issues, some that it concerns the subject matter, and some that it concerns the method. But others believe that the difference between New Kalam and classical kalam is essential: the two are fundamentally different things.

An essential difference means that the two are completely different—like salty salt and sweet sugar, which have nothing to do with one another and differ in their very nature. This view is saying that New Kalam is a different science.

This is a very important view: New Kalam is a different science. We should not think that New Theology is simply a continuation of classical kalam. For example, jurisprudence has new issues, but it remains the same jurisprudence; only its issues have changed. New Kalam, it is argued, is different: this discipline could not have arisen at all in the premodern world.

What is the new world? It is the modern world. Some sciences emerged only in the modern world. Even if we had lived for another thousand years in a traditional setting, we would not have had such sciences as psychology, sociology, and New Kalam. These are modern disciplines.

• term: روان‌شناسی and جامعه‌شناسی are translated as psychology and sociology.

These disciplines could never have arisen in the premodern world. Thus, the issue is not merely new questions; the science itself can be new. To understand this, we must know the difference between the modern and traditional worlds. Then we can understand how New Kalam differs from classical kalam and how psychology and sociology emerged.

This is a fundamental difference: there is a basic distinction between modernity and the traditional world.

• term: The speaker explicitly uses the English term fundamental.

How did we move from the old world to the new world? What happened? Since we do not have much time, I will explain it very briefly. In the modern world, several important historical events occurred that made us fundamentally different from the old world.

In the modern world, we encounter three revolutions.

• warning: The ASR contains extensive repetition and is incomplete here; only the clear statement about three revolutions is translated.

These three events are the philosophical revolution, the scientific revolution, and the Industrial Revolution. The most important is the philosophical revolution, because it led to the scientific revolution and then to the Industrial Revolution. If we explain the philosophical revolution, many other matters will become clear.

The Qur’an says: “There is no compulsion in religion; the right path has become distinct from error.” It then says: “Whoever disbelieves in ṭāghūt and believes in God has grasped the firmest handhold.”

• term: The Qur’anic Arabic is retained with an English translation; طاغوت is transliterated as ṭāghūt.

“Whoever disbelieves in ṭāghūt and believes in God has grasped the firmest handhold.” If we want to grasp that firm rope of God, we must first reject ṭāghūt and then believe. Disbelief in ṭāghūt is even more important than belief in God. Therefore, we must recognize ṭāghūt. What is the modern world?

If we do not understand modernity, we cannot reject ṭāghūt or distance ourselves from it; we may think it is something very good and become attached to it. Today, in schools and the media, we hear how excellent America and Europe are because we do not recognize ṭāghūt. The first event was the philosophical revolution.

The first event was the philosophical revolution—a revolution in thought. How did we think before and after the Renaissance? We reflected on three things: God, the world, and the human being.

• term: رنسانس is translated as the Renaissance.

In the past, God was both Creator and Rabb: He had created the world and also governed and directed it. God and the world, together with the human being’s relation to them, were central to thought.

• term: رب is retained as Rabb because it includes governance, nurture, and sustaining lordship.

At every moment, God is active in the world, governing and directing it. Before modernity, everyone accepted that God Most High could intervene in every moment and every detail of our lives.

“Praise be to God, Lord of the worlds.” Rubūbiyyah means that if God Most High ceased to act in the world even for a moment, everything would perish. Imagine an image in your mind: if you stop attending to it even for a moment, the image disappears. The world is likewise sustained in this way.

• term: ربوبیت is transliterated as rubūbiyyah and explained through the speaker’s example of continuous divine sustaining.

If your attention is withdrawn from that image, the image disappears. The world is the same: if God were, in an ontological sense, to withdraw His attention from us for even a moment, the world would not remain. Even the polytheists accepted God, but they associated partners with Him.

They attributed partners to God. In a monarchical system, they said that God was the king, and even human kings regarded themselves as being under God’s supervision. This did not mean denying God’s presence.

• warning: The latter part of the ASR is too corrupted to repair confidently; it is omitted rather than reconstructed.

In modernity, however, God’s governance of the world was set aside. It was said that God had made the world like a clock, after which it operated automatically and no longer required God’s presence or direction. God was removed from the sphere of the world.

Before this, the world was the world of creation—a world created by God. Afterwards, the world became natural: nature was understood as operating by itself. As a result, God’s role in the world disappeared. Once God was removed from the world, the world of creation became the world of nature.

When God was removed from the world, who took His place? The human being. Previously, the human being existed in a condition of ʿubūdiyyah—that is, servitude and worship. When people asked why one fasted, the answer was: because God has commanded it.

• term: عبودیت is transliterated as ʿubūdiyyah and explained as servitude and worship.

Now, however, we ask what benefit this practice has for the human being. This view says that we are humanists—that is, human-centered. The human being becomes the center and God recedes. This is humanism: the human being is placed at the center of everything.

• term: اومانیسم is translated as humanism and explained as human-centeredness.

When the human being becomes the center, revolutions occur in every field on the basis of this intellectual foundation. Our architecture becomes humanistic, and our medicine becomes human-centered. Then the scientific revolution takes place: modern science is not simply a continuation of traditional science.

Science acquired a different meaning for them; science now had another significance. The same transformation occurred in industry and produced the Industrial Revolution. These are extensive stories that I will explain at another time. When this foundation changed, new crises also emerged.

With the occurrence of the Industrial Revolution, psychological and intellectual crises emerged. When human beings become distant from God, the result is anxiety and depression, as the Qur’an says: “Indeed, hearts find rest in the remembrance of God.”

• term: The Qur’anic verse is translated while retaining its central reference to remembrance of God.

These psychological problems must be resolved, and in this setting new theological doubts arise. Such questions and problems did not exist in this form in the old world. When the human view changes, human questions also change. Thus, New Kalam emerged on the basis of new thought and a humanistic view of the world.

Its questions arose from a humanistic view of the world and a human-centered perspective. This led some people to try to answer these questions. The problem was this: on what foundation did those who wanted to respond to these doubts and crises intend to answer them?

They answered on a humanistic and human-centered basis. If you examine the answers in New Kalam and in Western books on philosophy of religion, you will see that although the questions are new, the answers are also formed on that same foundation. For example, in modern psychology, someone with a problem may sometimes be told to do whatever merely makes him feel comfortable—even something that Islam considers forbidden.

• warning: The ASR includes an explicit example that is partially corrupted; it is rendered in general terms without adding the uncertain details.

Such answers, then, are not based on religion, and we cannot accept this kind of perspective. These were the general points I presented today. I have explained them more coherently and precisely in the handout, both in relation to the scientific revolution and to the Industrial Revolution.

Finally, we will discuss the difference among New Theology, philosophy of religion, and New Kalam. These three fields are very similar and almost identical. The only difference is that in New Kalam, within a religious perspective and often in a Christian context, thinkers defend religious beliefs and try to make the answers religious. In philosophy of religion, they say that they have no commitment to religion and are free with respect to the subject; therefore, their answers are offered from a fully open perspective.

• warning: The claim that the fields are “almost identical” and the subsequent distinction follow the speaker’s formulation, although the terminology is contested in scholarship.

We will continue these discussions in future sessions, especially the difference between the modern and old worlds. We must recognize ṭāghūt and understand what the Industrial Revolution is, and whether it means only human progress or also has other dimensions. We will discuss these matters in future sessions. In the book on New Kalam that I am writing, I have begun some sections with a historical approach: why did these subjects and questions arise?

This book differs from my newer books because it is written with this approach: a historical approach concerned with the background of the issues, that is, why these questions arose. For this reason, it is difficult work. If any of you are willing, I would be glad for someone to translate the handout into English so that it can also be useful to others.

If any of you are interested, I will make the handout available to you. I only ask that you prepare a corrected version so that it can be used for study and translated into English, allowing others to benefit from it as well.

• warning: The closing ASR is substantially corrupted; the translation gives only the clearly recoverable request concerning revision, study, and English translation.