Usul 0906

In the name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful. With God Almighty’s help, protection, support, and guidance, we begin this session. Let us recite a Muhammadan salawat for the health of the Imam of the Age and the hastening of his relief: O God, bless Muhammad and the family of Muhammad.

Do you know what is happening to people there? Regarding the situation, have they finally pushed Israel back or not? They have been attacking and firing missiles for a long time. When they attack, does that mean they are attacking the tunnels as well? They have been attacking for quite some time; there is not really a war in the tunnels now—not to that extent, at least. For example, they carried out many attacks yesterday.

• warning: The ASR is highly corrupted; the repaired reading is approximate and preserves only the clear topic of attacks and tunnels.

They attack the tunnels as well, and they also attack from the Golan, though this began some time ago. They are also carrying out many attacks several kilometers away. We are deeply distressed by this situation in Lebanon. These poor people have been under severe pressure for several nights. May God destroy Israel; it truly recognizes no limit in its crimes.

• warning: Several place names and phrases are unclear in the ASR; ‘Golan’ and the general reference to Israeli attacks are the most likely readings.

I remember that in 2006, when the war began, Ayatollah Bahjat changed the supplication in his qunut. During the thirty-three-day war, he recited that prayer every day. This was the first Hezbollah–Israel war, and it lasted thirty-three days. During the qunut of his obligatory prayer, he would say: “O God, grant victory to Islam and its people, and defeat disbelief and its people.” I remember this supplication, which had a continuation as well. We must be very mindful of these oppressed people.

• term: Qunut is the supplication recited while standing in prayer, especially in the second rakʿah.

These oppressed Shiʿis come from every corner of the world, and we see them as our brothers. They truly are part of our own body. The Shiʿis of Lebanon are very good people—kind and deeply religious.

I have a Lebanese friend; perhaps you know him. He is a Qur’an reciter. He came to Iran once, and we became friends. Later, he came to Iran again, and we went out together. One day he called and said, “I am in Iran.” The Lebanese have a school in one of the cities; perhaps you have seen it.

• warning: The friend’s name and the school’s location are not recoverable from the ASR.

He said, “Let’s see each other.” We went to his home and ate together—a Lebanese chicken sandwich, something like shawarma, which was very delicious. Then we went to a shop whose seller was Lebanese. There he gave me a gift: a beautiful Yemeni ʿaqiq ring. I said that its spiritual value was greater than its material value. I asked, “What do you mean by its spiritual value?”

• term: ʿAqiq is a semiprecious stone traditionally used for rings, especially in Shiʿi devotional culture.

He said, “This ring came to us from Sayyid Hasan. It belonged to Sayyid Hasan. My father-in-law is a friend of one of his guards, who obtained it from Sayyid Hasan for me.” He added, “Because I am very fond of you, I want to give it to you.” Since then, I no longer take it off.

• warning: The identity of ‘Sayyid Hasan’ is not explicitly recoverable from the transcript.

I keep it in my prayer mat because I am afraid of losing it. Whenever I reach for it during prayer, I remember the martyred father and those who have passed away. These memories affect our hearts deeply. One of the students of the late Ayatollah Bahjat was ill and suffered severe back pain. The doctor had said that he definitely needed surgery.

• warning: The ASR is unclear regarding the person remembered; the translation retains the general reference to bereavement.

They were going to place something in his back, an iron rod, so that he would no longer be able to bend, although his back pain would improve. Then he said, “I want not to undergo the operation.” I asked, “Why do you not want the operation? Go ahead so you can be free of this pain.” He said, “Because they have told me that I will no longer be able to perform sajdah; I will no longer be able to prostrate on the ground.”

• term: Sajdah is the prostration performed in Muslim prayer.

That is, you would not be able to bend completely. But he said, “These prayers by friends and companions help greatly in reducing and improving this pain.” We also have a role in this war; our role is prayer. Let us not neglect prayer, so that—God forbid—we are not held accountable in the Hereafter. Very well, in the name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful. I know I have seen all of you before, because of the book you are holding. Now, let us begin reading.

• context: The lecturer transitions here from remarks on Lebanon and prayer to the lesson.

Let us read: “The first matter: the definition and preliminaries of uṣūl.” Regarding the flashcards I mentioned, think about them and see whether a good idea comes to mind, or whether something similar has already been done from which we can take inspiration. There is a site called SlideShare; if I am not mistaken, it may have a section for flashcards. Perhaps it is actually a flashcard website. They post various lessons there in flashcard form. It is very interesting: the flashcards themselves are on the site, somewhat like PowerPoint.

• term: Uṣūl here refers to uṣūl al-fiqh, the principles and methodology of Islamic jurisprudence.

The format is that you first see the front of the card, and when you click it, the back and its meaning appear. You can learn many things with it. Think about whether a creative idea comes to mind that would not be limited to this course—for example, a platform or application for different subjects. With your creative, mathematical, and computer-oriented minds, see whether such a thing can be made; if it can, that would be excellent. I have something like this in mind for fiqh, because it is an issue we always need. But now you have read this from beginning to end.

• term: Fiqh means the disciplined understanding and derivation of practical Islamic rulings.

Let me ask two questions so that the material remains in your minds. What are the definition, subject matter, and purpose of the science of uṣūl? We want to know what the science of uṣūl is, what its subject matter is, and what its end or purpose is.

Can ghāyah be translated as “utility”? No, not here. In English we have teleological theories, and we have Utilitarianism. Utility means benefit, but ghāyah here does not necessarily mean benefit. Ghāyah means the end—the endpoint or purpose of the science.

• term: Ghāyah is the endpoint, aim, or purpose of a discipline; it is not automatically equivalent to utility.

There is a famous question: “Does the end justify the means?” That “end” is ghāyah. When we ask whether the end justifies the means, this ghāyah is not the same as benefit. The expression uṣūl al-fiqh consists of two words: uṣūl and fiqh. These two words indicate that there are principles and rules upon which fiqh relies.

• term: Uṣūl al-fiqh literally means the principles of fiqh; the lecture is beginning with the grammatical and conceptual implications of the expression.

Why do we say uṣūlan rather than qawāʿidan? Because uṣūl is diptote, whereas qawāʿid is not. The phrase “uṣūlan wa-qawāʿidan yatakiʾu al-fiqhu ʿalayhā” means that there are principles and rules upon which fiqh relies.

• term: The grammatical point concerns the Arabic category of diptotes (mamnuʿ min al-ṣarf), which affects case endings.

Fiqh relies on those principles. Therefore, to understand this expression, we must unpack the two words. First we define fiqh, and then we define uṣūl. If we want to define uṣūl al-fiqh, we must first define fiqh and then determine what these principles on which fiqh relies are. What is the definition of fiqh?

The well-known definition of fiqh is: “It is knowledge of the subsidiary religious rulings derived from their detailed proofs.” Fiqh means knowledge of the subsidiary sharʿi rulings based on their detailed evidences. First, fiqh must be knowledge. For now, we will not discuss this part; it will be explained in the book. We are not like the Sunnis in this respect.

• term: The standard definition is al-ʿilm bi-l-aḥkām al-sharʿiyyah al-farʿiyyah ʿan adillatihā al-tafṣīliyyah.

Fiqh cannot be built on analogy, conjecture, or mere supposition; one must attain knowledge. We are not like those who construct rulings through istiḥsān, blocking the means, maṣāliḥ mursalah, and similar methods. We will not discuss other disagreements, such as maqāṣid al-sharīʿah, for now. The meaning of “sharʿi rulings” is also clear.

• term: Istiḥsān, sadd al-dharāʾiʿ, maṣāliḥ mursalah, and maqāṣid al-sharīʿah are technical terms associated with differing Sunni legal methodologies.

Sharʿi rulings are those found in the Sharīʿah. But the Sharīʿah is not only fiqh; it includes beliefs, rulings, ethics, and various other matters. When we say “subsidiary sharʿi rulings,” primary religious matters—such as the principles of doctrine—are excluded from the definition of fiqh. We are not discussing tawḥīd, prophethood, and similar matters here. The qualification “subsidiary” excludes them, and “derived from detailed proofs” is another qualification.

• term: The distinction is between uṣūl al-dīn or foundational beliefs and furūʿ al-dīn or practical subsidiary rulings.

Sharʿi rulings are distinguished from rational rulings. I am not discussing rational rulings here; I am speaking only about sharʿi rulings. One might ask whether reason is therefore outside the Sharīʿah. That is not the point: we are not saying that revealed legislation is irrational, nor that those who discuss fiqh are unreasonable. We cannot make such an allegation.

• warning: The opening of the passage is damaged in the ASR; the translation follows the clear contrast between sharʿi and rational rulings.

Keep one general rule in mind: we are concerned with the channel through which a ruling reaches us. We may arrive at an output through experience, through proof and rational argument, or through mathematical reasoning. Today mathematical logic is even used in arguments for God’s existence. But our discussion concerns the route through which a ruling reaches us.

Mathematical logic also examines arguments for God’s existence. Have you heard of the fine-tuning argument? Fine-tuning combines probability theory and physics. It argues that the configuration of the universe is so precise that there is a very high probability that it must have an organizer and creator. Suppose you arrive at the conclusion that God exists.

• term: Fine-tuning is the argument that the precise values of cosmological parameters are evidence of an intelligent designer.

Reason says that God exists, experience says that God exists, and the Sharīʿah says that God exists. We are not concerned here with the output; we are concerned with the input and the channel that produces the result. In uṣūl, when I say “sharʿi ruling,” I do not mean a nonrational ruling. I mean that I receive the ruling through revelation—from God and the Ahl al-Bayt—although uṣūl al-fiqh does contain a section called al-mustaqillāt al-ʿaqliyyah, rationally independent judgments.

• term: Al-mustaqillāt al-ʿaqliyyah are judgments that reason can independently recognize, within the Imami uṣūl tradition.

If someone possesses complete reason, may God willing grant him a long life in this world. Shaykh al-Aʿẓam cites the late Astarabadi, who was one of the Akhbaris. Ayatollah Hasan-Zadeh Amoli also wrote a book entitled The Qur’an, Mysticism, and Demonstration Are Not Separable. That is the title: Qur’an, ʿirfān, and burhān.

• term: Akhbārī refers to the hadith-centered school within Imami Shiʿi jurisprudence; ʿirfān means Islamic mystical knowledge, and burhān means rational demonstration.

There is a disagreement, and sometimes certain jurists declare mysticism and philosophy to be unbelief, saying that they speak nonsense. Among the living marājiʿ there are also cases of obligatory precaution; that is, if a jurist issues such a ruling through a fatwa or legal principle, one must avoid that matter. Consider how far the disagreement goes. What did Ayatollah Hasan-Zadeh write in such an environment?

• term: Marājiʿ are senior jurists whom believers may follow in taqlīd; iḥtiyāṭ wājib means obligatory precaution.

In his book he writes: “The Qur’an, mysticism, and demonstration are not separable.” That means one cannot reject demonstration, mysticism, or the Qur’an. Of course, the mysticism Hasan-Zadeh means may differ from other forms of mysticism, and the demonstration he means has its own specific sense. He cites this statement from the late Astarabadi: “The perfect philosopher and the perfect mystic are the infallible Imam.” Why?

Because complete reason is complete philosophy; and if you want to know complete philosophy, that philosophy is found in the house of ʿAlī and the descendants of ʿAlī. If reason reaches perfection, whatever it says accords with the ruling of the Sharīʿah. Those who object do not understand reason’s ruling completely and do not know the truth. Take, for example, the story of Qārūn in the Qur’an. If we know only half of that story, our view of the world changes.

• term: The “house of Ali” refers to the Ahl al-Bayt, the Prophet’s family in Shiʿi theology.

In the story of Qārūn, when Qārūn came out in great splendor and majesty—if we want a modern example, with a luxurious penthouse, a diamond ring, and a Rolex watch—the people said: “Would that we had the like of what Qārūn has been given.” Today, too, when we see someone’s wealth and lifestyle, we say, “If only we had a little of that.”

But the Qur’an tells us what those who possessed knowledge said. They knew the whole story: “Woe to you! The reward of God is better for whoever believes and acts righteously.” What God has given you—the wilayah of the Ahl al-Bayt and the ability to worship God—is more valuable than all the property of Elon Musk, Bill Gates, and Qārūn.

• term: Wilāyah here denotes allegiance to and spiritual guardianship of the Ahl al-Bayt.

But they were not convinced. When they saw the entire story and reached the end of the film, they said: “Those who had desired his position only yesterday began to say: Woe! God truly enlarges provision for whom He wills among His servants and restricts it.” Qārūn was swallowed by the earth with his treasures—not only he, but also his house.

God says that these are the people who possess knowledge. Before the story ends, everyone in the Hereafter will understand who was right; but what matters is understanding it beforehand. The Qur’an says that those who had wished the previous day to occupy Qārūn’s position said, “Had God not been gracious to us, He would have caused us to be swallowed as well.”

• warning: The Qur’anic quotation is partially garbled in the ASR; the translation follows the recognizable passage from Qur’an 28:79–82.

Yesterday they had said, “If only we had what Qārūn had,” but after seeing his fate they understood that poverty and wealth are in God’s hands: “Had God not been gracious to us, He would have caused us to be swallowed.” They said that if God had not shown them grace, they too would now be beneath the earth. Why did they say this? Because the Ahl al-Bayt, peace be upon them, know the whole story of creation and existence, and they do not legislate rulings contrary to reason.

Do you remember that in the discussion of blood money we read the narration of ʿUmar ibn Ḥanẓalah? He is a major figure. Sunnis weaken anyone who shows the slightest indication of Shiʿism, but they speak highly of ʿUmar ibn Ḥanẓalah and authenticate him in their books, even though he was a Shiʿi. ʿUmar ibn Ḥanẓalah went to Imam al-Ṣādiq, peace be upon him.

• warning: The name is uncertain in the ASR; ‘ʿUmar ibn Ḥanẓalah’ is the likely intended narrator.

Regarding blood money, a woman’s blood money is equal to a man’s up to one-third; after one-third, it becomes half. He asked Imam al-Ṣādiq: if a man cuts off a woman’s finger, how much is the blood money? The Imam said: one thousand. For two fingers, two thousand; for three, three thousand; but for four fingers, two thousand. ʿUmar ibn Ḥanẓalah was astonished and said, “Master, that is very abrupt!” The Imam replied: “Slowly, O ʿUmar. The matter of religion is not to be determined by analogy; when it is subjected to analogy, religion is obliterated.”

• term: Diyah is legally prescribed blood money; qiyās is analogical reasoning, rejected as an independent source in Imami jurisprudence.

Muḥiqa means to be effaced or destroyed. Muḥāq refers to the days when the moon is not visible in the sky. If you determine religion through analogy, it disappears and nothing remains of it. The Sunnis have based many rulings on analogy. I have left many points for you to connect yourselves. Now let us return to the next phrase: “from their detailed proofs.”

• term: The lecturer uses the lunar meaning of muḥāq to illustrate the sense of disappearance.

“From the detailed proofs” means that in fiqh we seek subsidiary sharʿi rulings through detailed evidences. What is excluded by the phrase “detailed proofs”? General or summary evidence. A person whose duty is taqlīd is excluded by this qualification.

• term: Taqlīd is following a qualified living jurist in practical legal rulings.

The follower says to the jurist, “Whatever the mujtahid says, and whatever my marjaʿ says, I will do.” But the follower does not need to know why. The mujtahid must answer the “why” in the Hereafter, because he is responsible for the evidence. The mujtahid has access to detailed proofs, whereas you possess general evidence: you know only that the marjaʿ’s statement is authoritative for you.

• term: Mujtahid is a jurist qualified to derive rulings; ḥujjah means an authoritative proof.

The mujtahid’s statement is authoritative for you, so you do not need to investigate every detail yourself. For example, when someone becomes a marjaʿ, do you know every proof that he has examined? No. You follow him in taqlīd, and his statement is authoritative for you.

Can this be implemented completely? Is it enough for the marjaʿ to assume all responsibility? No. In the humanities there is a concept perhaps called “meaningful human intervention”; I am not entirely sure of the exact term. It means that a human being must be placed in the middle of the process, and that we cannot hand everything over to him completely.

• warning: The English technical expression is uncertain in the ASR and in the speaker’s own wording.

We must establish prerequisites and conditions for the marjaʿ, so that he does not say or do just anything; but we also do not place all responsibility in his hands. Let me give an example from the time of the Prophet. The Messenger of God sent a group with a man for a military expedition. At night, on the route, they lit a fire, sat around it, and made a large fire.

• term: Sariyyah is a military expedition sent by the Prophet that he did not personally lead.

The commander said, “Rise and enter the fire. Am I not appointed by the Prophet?” They replied, “We will not go,” joked about it, and the matter ended. When they returned and reported it to the Prophet, he said, “Had they gone, they all would have entered Hell.” Although the commander had been specially appointed, they still had to exercise their own judgment in that case. If this applies to a marjaʿ, what do we say about the walī faqīh?

• term: Walī faqīh is the jurist exercising guardianship; the example concerns limits on obedience to delegated authority.

The same applies even to the walī faqīh, except in matters such as issuing a command for jihād. A governmental حکم differs from a fatwa. A حکم is binding on others, even if they themselves are marājiʿ. For example, about eight or ten years ago, Ayatollah Khamenei issued a ruling concerning Eid al-Fiṭr. One way of establishing the Eid is through the ruler’s حکم.

• term: Ḥukm is a binding directive of the Islamic ruler; fatwā is a jurist’s legal opinion for followers.

That year Ayatollah Khamenei issued the ruling only once, but one of the marājiʿ did not accept it because he did not accept crescent sighting through a telescope. People objected and said, “The ruler’s حکم is binding on you.” He replied that the ruler’s حکم in a religious matter is binding only when its basis and criterion are clear.

The basis of his حکم was sighting through a telescope, whereas I do not accept sighting through a telescope or an optical aid; therefore that حکم does not become binding upon me. Even where the ruler’s حکم exists, there remains a way to examine its basis. Let me give another example: in the story of al-Khiḍr and Moses, both are infallible; al-Khiḍr is a prophet of God, and Moses is also a divinely commissioned prophet and one of the messengers of firm resolve.

• term: Ulū al-ʿazm refers to the major prophets traditionally identified as Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad.

In Sūrat al-Kahf, Moses went to al-Khiḍr to learn from him. Although he had promised not to object, he objected in all three incidents. Why? Because he encountered actions that, on their face, appeared contrary to the Sharīʿah: killing a young man, damaging a ship, and repairing a wall. Even if someone is God’s special deputy, a person must react when an action plainly appears wrong; al-Khiḍr then explained the reality behind each event.

• context: The three episodes are Qur’an 18:60–82; the lecturer uses them to illustrate the limits of unexamined obedience.

I will erase this part because my writing has become too fast and is difficult for you to read. If I do not erase it, it will bother you. Faith, faith, faith…

• warning: This passage is mostly classroom-management speech and repeated words; the exact wording is uncertain.

The qualification “sharʿi” excludes rational rulings, and the qualification “subsidiary” excludes doctrinal rulings and questions of religious foundations. The qualification “detailed” excludes the knowledge of the follower. The follower does possess knowledge of the rulings, but although he knows the rulings, his knowledge does not come from detailed evidence; rather, it rests on general evidence.

The follower’s general evidence is the authority of the mujtahid’s judgment for him in all rulings. The mujtahid’s statement is binding and authoritative for the follower. But the mujtahid knows each ruling through its specific evidence; he does not rely on general evidence, but examines the detailed proof. This is the difference between the mujtahid and the follower.

To explain uṣūl and mention the necessary matters, I will state three points. First is the definition of the science of uṣūl. This science discusses rules through which one can derive sharʿi rulings from their evidences. In other words, in this science we seek rules and principles by which sharʿi rulings can be obtained from the proofs.

We encounter a narration. That narration passes through a process and becomes a sharʿi ruling. Uṣūl explains how this process takes place; it provides rules through which the narration is examined and transformed into a conclusion.

The narration must enter the process, and its apparent meaning may undergo interpretive changes. Narrations pass through this stage, and there are rules that examine their content. These rules are what we study in uṣūl. For example, if a narration contains an imperative, what does it mean? Does it indicate obligation or recommendation?

What if we have a prohibition? For example, we know that intercourse on the nights of Ramadan was initially forbidden, whereas intercourse at the beginning, middle, and end of a lunar month is generally permissible. In which month is intercourse at the beginning of the month recommended?

Ramadan, correct? Why? When the verse was revealed, God said: “It has been permitted for you, on the nights of the fast, to be intimate with your wives; they are clothing for you and you are clothing for them.” God said that He had made it lawful for them. Here we have a rule: when the text says “it has been permitted for you,” does that mean mere permissibility? Does it indicate that it had previously been forbidden?

• term: The passage refers to Qur’an 2:187 and the uṣūl question of what legal force is conveyed by a declaration of permissibility.

Now “it has been permitted for you” means lawful and permissible; why should we say it is recommended? The qualification or explanation provided by the Infallible is important in understanding such rulings. God then says: “God knew that you were betraying yourselves”; He knew that many of you would not observe the prohibition. This is an important educational principle: in law and upbringing, do not establish a rule that you know will be violated.

For example, I tell my child, “You are not allowed to watch television.” But I know that if he cannot watch it in front of me, then when I am not home he will turn it on secretly; if he cannot use the television, he will take his mother’s phone and watch online, or watch it at school. Instead, manage the situation: say, “You may watch this program, this film, or this series.”

• warning: The final sentence of the ASR is too corrupted to reconstruct confidently; it has been omitted rather than invented.

This does not establish a fatwa of prohibition; at most, it may establish a ruling of makrūh. Some people have made other claims about certain cases, but it is not a fatwa of prohibition. For example, if someone has committed zinā, we do not say that every subsequent consequence is forbidden, even though we have a narration on the subject. Why? Because we must examine what the narration actually indicates.

• term: Makrūh means discouraged or disliked; zinā means unlawful sexual intercourse.

The verse uses the expression “and He has forbidden that,” but its meaning must be examined precisely. For two minutes, look at this book: “The derivation of sharʿi rulings from the evidences, or what the mujtahid reaches when the evidences are unavailable.” What is this definition trying to say? Can anyone explain it?

• warning: The cited Arabic wording is partially uncertain in the ASR; the translation preserves its identifiable definition.

It means that in uṣūl we discuss rules by which the mujtahid reaches the ijtihadi evidences, or determines his duty when he cannot reach such evidence. Listen carefully to this point, because we will need it in later discussions. Sometimes we have a narration, and the narration functions as an authoritative indication and probabilistic proof.

• term: Amārah is an evidentiary indicator that yields justified probability; ijtihādī evidence is evidence used in derivation.

Sometimes we reach an issue about which we have no narration. What should we do then? You say: precaution. Part of uṣūl concerns precisely these situations in which we distinguish between two kinds of evidence: ijtihadi evidences, such as amārāt and narrations, and fiqhi evidences, which are called al-uṣūl al-ʿamaliyyah.

• term: Al-uṣūl al-ʿamaliyyah are practical principles used when conclusive or indicative evidence is unavailable.

Pay attention to why they are called practical principles. The mujtahid reaches a point and asks, “What should I do?” The Lawgiver has already said that when you do not know what to do, He provides several general principles to determine your duty. As long as you have access to ijtihadi evidence, you must use it; once that access is exhausted, you turn to the practical principles. These may be precaution, barāʾah, or istiṣḥāb.

• term: Barāʾah is the presumption of freedom from obligation; istiṣḥāb is the presumption that a previously established state continues.

Each of these has a detailed discussion and specific conditions depending on the situation. We cannot always prescribe precaution; in many cases we say barāʾah, meaning that no obligation rests upon you. “Yantahī ilayhi al-mujtahid” means what the mujtahid reaches when the ijtihadi evidences have come to an end.

“Yantahī ilayhi” means that he ends up at it and reaches it, not that he fails to do it. “What the mujtahid reaches when the ijtihadi evidences are unavailable” refers to the rules that govern the mujtahid’s work. When you reach doubt, lack of knowledge, or a question mark, the Lawgiver has not abandoned you.

The Lawgiver has not said, “Use analogy,” or “Turn to maṣāliḥ mursalah.” Rather, He has established a route for you to follow. Therefore, the science of uṣūl al-fiqh consists of the taṣdīqī preliminaries of fiqh. Every science has two kinds of preliminaries: conceptual preliminaries and propositional or confirmatory preliminaries.

• term: Mabādiʾ taṣawwuriyyah are conceptual preliminaries; mabādiʾ taṣdīqiyyah are propositions or principles established elsewhere and used by the science.

Conceptual preliminaries are the matters we are currently learning. What is the distinction? These are conceptual preliminaries: we must have a correct and clear conception. For example, in physics we ask what matter, gas, and liquid are. These concepts are introduced at the beginning of physics and constitute conceptual preliminaries of that science.

Confirmatory preliminaries, however, are a set of propositions that are not discussed within the science itself. They have been established elsewhere, but they are used in this science. For example, in physics one does not begin by answering a skeptical question about whether matter exists.

A physicist does not begin by offering ten arguments for the existence of matter; that is examined in philosophy. Philosophy establishes the existence of matter, and physics uses it, saying that all its discussion is based on matter’s existence. In uṣūl, likewise, we prepare the confirmatory preliminaries of fiqh. We give you tools to use in fiqh. In fiqh, one does not study an hour of uṣūl before every lesson; we establish these confirmatory preliminaries of fiqh in uṣūl.

“It undertakes to explain how evidence is established for a sharʿi ruling.” The science of uṣūl is responsible for explaining how proof is established for a sharʿi ruling and for identifying one’s religious duty. We will stop here. Send a salawat. I hope you succeed.